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Abstract 
Purpose 
Prior research emphasizes that organizational founders have a good deal of influence in organizational 
development and, where ICTs are involved, a generic strategy is usually deployed by managers in order to deal 
with any resistance that might occur. Cognisant of this, we investigated the role played by a Managing Director 
of an SME consultancy in an ICT project associated with organizational development.  
Design/methodology/approach 
This study is based on an ethnography of a ICT related change management initiative which, theoretically, takes 
into account though from the social shaping of technology – speifically the idea that technologies in their 
broadest sense are subject to ongoing work beyond the design stage. 
Findings 
We argue that Markus’ Interaction Theory of resistance still has relevance today and we extend it by 
emphasizing the problem of homogenizing users and downplaying their ability to appropriate resistance 
strategies in situ. 
Research limitations/implications 
Our study is based upon one group of individual’s experiences.  Further case studies of resistance success are 
required which further highlight how such this is achieved and why. 
Practical implications 
Those engaged with organisational development projects need to be better educated as to the reasons for 
resistance, particularly positive ones, and the methods by which this might take place. 
Originality/value 
This study conceptualises strategies for ‘overcoming’ resistance as managerial technologies. Conceptualising 
them in this way, shows the deployement of such technologies to be a complicated and active process where the 
audience for such things are involved in how they are received and appropriated to suite differing agendas. 
Keywords: Owner Manager, SME, User Resistance, User Participation. 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Within management studies, particularly those relating to strategic management and entrepreneurship, it is often 
argued that the founders of companies are influential in shaping the emergence of organisations and their 
continuing development via the moulding of cultures and strategies (Darazdi, 1993; Reynolds and Miller, 1992; 
Carter et. al., 1996; Boeker, 1988). However, this line of thinking has been subjected to critique. Indeed, culture 
regularly presents itself as a ‘difficult’ concept for all of the social sciences (Williams, 1983: 87). It can be seen 
as: a response to biological determinism; a delineator between what is viewed as civilised or barbarian; an 
ideology in terms of a set of beliefs attitudes and opinions; artistic practices and, of course ways of life 
(Abercrombie et al., 2000).  In cognisance of a more sophisticated view of culture then, the picture of 
organisational founders put forward by many strategy and entrepreneurship researchers is said to be framed by a 
monolithic view of organisational culture which emphasises organization-wide consensus, homogeneity and one 
whereby top management are assumed to be sacrosanct (Martin et. al., 1985). Such studies have also been 
criticised due to their uncritical acceptance of ‘official’ accounts of organizational history (Alvesson, 1993; 
Rowlinson and Proctor, 1999). In a small medium sized enterprise (SME) context it has been suggested that 
owners are integral to technology adoption. Levy and Powell (2002) for instance, suggest that the recognition of 
the business value of the Internet combined with an owner’s attitude to business growth are key factors in 
determining Internet adoption strategies. However, Millward and Lewis (2005) suggest otherwise in that they see 
the dominance of an owner/manager having a detrimental impact upon product development programmes. Thus 
whilst some argue that company founders have a great deal of influence within SME organisations, others are 
more sceptical regarding its quantity and quality. In this paper, we explore the influence of the founder, and 
Managing Director of a SME consultancy during a phase of an Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) related organisational development project.  
 
The issue of user resistance is a key consideration in ICT development projects. Indeed, there is a significant 
body of literature examining the complexities of user resistance in ICT projects dating back several decades 
(Keen, 1981; Dickson and Simmons, 1970). Many academics give warnings that existing empirical and 
theoretical research regarding resistance research in ICT contexts suggesting it lacks relevance, rigor and weak 
theoretical foundations (Marakas and Hornik, 1996; Lyytinen, 1988). Indeed, Jiang et. al. (1997) suggest that the 
problems are widespread and pervasive as no single feature can describe the phenomenon entirely. As King and 
Anderson (1995:168) state, resistance is a ‘complex kaleidoscope of interrelated factors’. Over the years, 
attention has been given to the reasons for resistance and strategies to ‘deal with’ this phenomenon, yet there is 
still no widespread agreement on how to successfully engage with such practices (Hirschheim and Newman, 
1988). Whilst emphasis has been placed on investigating the link between user acceptance and user resistance 
(Davis, 1989; Venkatesh et. al., 2003; Delone and McLean, 1992; Wong and Tate, 1994), much of this work 
ignores (or turns a blind eye) to the heterogeneous, situated nature of users (Lamb and Kling, 2003) and with that 
the further nuance of system purpose (Jiang et. al., 2000). Additionally there is a lack of attention to the tensions 
between different users affected by the development and implementation process which if addressed would focus 
the lens somewhat upon the heterogeneous user (Markus, 1983; Wong and Tate, 1994). This view persists even 
though user reactions, intentions and behaviour may differ if a system type is mandatory, voluntary, hedonic and 
depending on their characteristics such as their place within the organisational hierarchy (Marakus and Hornik, 
1996; Barki and Huff, 1985; van der Heijden, 2004; Jiang et. al., 2000; Butler and Fitzgerald, 1997). With this in 
mind, we introduce our study which is concerned with the idea that organisational actors involved in ICT related 
change are not a homogeneous group, but rather users belonging to distinct groupings, each with their own 
organisational and personal agendas. In this paper, against a backdrop of user resistance in an ICT development 
context, we aim to explore this further by drawing upon Markus’ (1983) arguments for an Interaction Theory of 
resistance and a study of a pilot of a custom developed customer relationship management system at a SME. In 
doing this we illustrate how a Managing Director’s strategy for overcoming resistance proved ineffective, whilst 
simultaneously becoming a conduit for successful resistance for various users. Our work emphasises the need to 
consider diversity in users, their resistance practices and their abilities to appropriate managerial strategies for 
dealing with resistance.  
 
The first section of the paper briefly considers the nature of user resistance within an ICT context. This 
exploration was edifying in highlighting some problems and limitations of the generic strategies designed for 
overcoming resistance. In the following sections we present an interpretation of the findings from an 
ethnographic investigation of the responses of diverse actors involved in the pilot project that brought about 
diverse resistance practices. Finally conclusions are drawn which centre on providing insights into why the 
Managing Director’s generic strategy to avert organisational-wide resistance went wrong and how user 
resistance could be labelled as a success. In sum, we argue this is because, despite the overall level of influence 
of the Managing Director, the generic strategy for overcoming resistance deployed, did not account for the 
diversity in resistance practices employed including those that involved the appropriation of his strategy to meet 
particular resister’s objectives. 
2 USER RESISTANCE IN AN ICT CONTEXT 
In a general context, resistance can be understood as the intentional acts of commission or omission that defy the 
wishes of others (Ashforth and Mael, 1998; Newman, 1989). In an organisational context, resistance can be seen 
as the activities or intentions through which those in organisations seek to oppose official and unofficial forms of 
control (Marakas and Hornik, 1996; Gabriel, 2000; Newman, 1989). In an ICT context, this might translate into 
users preventing system designers achieving their objectives (Markus, 1983). Users of ICTs often respond in 
different ways to the changes associated with them (Dickson and Simmons, 1970). Such responses include total 
rejection and through to a moderate rejection of some of its functionality (Markus, 1983; Doolin, 2004), 
demonstrated resistance (Hirschheim and Newman, 1988), passive resistance (Marakas and Hornik, 1996), or 
reluctant begrudging acceptance (Brown et. al., 2002; Jiang et. al., 2000). Resistance practices can be seen as a 
reaction, a symptom (Hirschheim and Newman, 1988), an indicator of users attempting to appropriate changes 
processes. Thus, if resistance practices are not given serious, meaningful consideration, they can, rightly or 
wrongly, undermine system implementation efforts.  
 
In Markus’ (1983) work, she introduces the idea of an Interaction Theory of resistance. Here resistance is not 
enacted because of innate user factors (people determined) or because of technological system features (system 
determined). Resistance is enacted due to the interaction of a system and the context within which it is to be 
used. Markus thus argues that no one set of tactics are ever going to avoid resistance and that in order to address 
this, a thorough socio-political analysis of the situation is required. In this study we intend to take this as our 
starting point and, in the following sections, extend this position by referring to the broader literature regarding 
resistance, and our ethnographic investigation, in order to evaluate the situation 25 years on.  
2.1 Conceptions of Resistance: Nature and Method 
The notion of resistance often invokes the images of confrontation, hostility and conflict, a negative idiom that is 
often used by those initiating or facilitating a change. This tactic of spotlighting resistance as destructive 
strengthens and privileges management’s position so that the rationality of the organisation (read management’s) 
is justified to triumph over the interests of the users (Newman, 1989). Newman thus reports that resistance is 
often viewed as negative, associated with derogatory actions that require eradication. Resistance, therefore, is 
often portrayed as subversive and unlawful, often involving gratuitous acts of sabotage. Yet, Markus’ (1983) 
Interaction Theory of resistance, which draws heavily from Kling’s (1980) examination of theories of resistance, 
starts from a different position. It posits that systems acquire different social and political meaning in different 
environments and that disparate users may react to the same system differently. Therefore, a well-designed 
system may be resisted because there may be a potential shift in power relations or of social status because of the 
system’s capabilities. The ‘real reasons’ for resistance are the perceived values and social content gains or losses 
of users that occur before or after system implementation (Markus, 1983; Keen, 1981). It can therefore been seen 
as functional, as an indicator that things are not working as well as they could be, and that they highlight 
opportunities for learning. As Suchman and Bishop (2000) point out, naming of innovation is a political effort, 
often those who are labelled the resister in opposition to so called innovation effort are actually the innovators – 
they desire radical change and resistance is a helpful indicator of this. In summary, resistance can be 
conceptualised as a good or bad thing. 
 
Theoretically two conceptions of methods of resistance are identifiable – overt and covert. Marakas and Hornik 
(1996) suggest that resistance to change is an observable behaviour. This overt behaviour will be or can be 
observed by others, manifesting itself as dysfunctional behaviour motivated by criminal intent or personal gain. 
By contrast, passive, or covert, forms of resistance are hard to detect. It may involve users demonstrating a 
reluctant acceptance, with no outward displays of frustration regarding, or rejection of, the system (Lauer and 
Rajagopalan, 2003; Marakas and Hornik, 1996). The passive resister may resentfully accept the system, 
customising working practices, silently scheming to conspire in its downfall. Such a user may exhibit acceptance 
and resistance concurrently, towards different facets of the system, depending on their stance, knowledge, level 
of control, or politics. Resistance can sit very happily alongside acceptance. 
2.2 Resistance Rationales: Why is happens and How to deal with it 
Most research regarding reasons for resistance in ICT projects predominantly refers to the resister’s pathological 
fear of change (Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Selwyn, 2003; Hirschheim et. al., 1988). More specifically, Keen 
(1981) has also pointed out that ICTs may alter relationships, working patterns, and communication channels 
and, with that, perceived power, authority and control. Doolin’s (2004) research, for example, explores how 
ICTs may be cloaked as an efficiency exercise or a strategic decision, and highlights how sophisticated users can 
influence organisational practices and manipulate technologies by facilitating power and control within an 
organisational setting. Further, change has been reported as an intruder into the familiar working environment of 
users who, in turn, perceive the ICT as threatening and unnecessary, and ultimately as a criticism of their 
working practices (Keen, 1981; Grover, 1988; Markus and Pfeffer, 1983). Underlying these guidelines, or 
strategies, is the notion that ICT development is political beast as well as technological animal, ‘resistance is not 
a problem to be solved…it is a useful clue to what went wrong’ (Markus, 1983: 441). Despite more general 
examples of positive resistance, such as the actions of the French Resistance in World War II, within ICT 
research very few studies see such practices in this way.   
 
Unsurprisingly then, research on ICTs is replete with strategies for predicting (Kettinger 2002), pre-empting 
(Martinko et. al., 1996) and over-coming (Keen, 1981) resistance. Such strategies tend to focus upon the 
practicalities of how to influence the processes by which resistance is coped with in organisations. There are 
many exemplars of non-specific guidelines and/or generic solutions for indistinct users groups (Keen, 1981). 
Additionally, there are many different models, frameworks and strategies to evaluate user attitudes, on the 
premise that they are valuable tools for predicting user satisfaction (Barki and Huff, 1985) and, hence, a lack of 
resistance (Al-Gahtani and King, 1999; Brown et. al., 2002; Kujala, 2003; Venkatesh et. al., 2003; Kettinger, 
2002). Jiang et. al., (2000) report on a variety of strategies that researchers have identified to overcome 
resistance, which they classify into two groupings: participative and directive. Participative strategies are ‘user 
friendly’ and focus upon training, building support structures, releasing adequate resources; architecting an 
optimistic environment. Directive strategies are practical ‘business driven solutions’ which focus upon financial 
incentives for use of system, role modifications, power redistribution, top management support, job status 
modification, and job counselling but ultimately job elimination for those who do not want to learn to use the 
new system.  
 
Given that conceptions of resistance, how it is done, and why it happens are generally viewed negatively then, it 
is no surprise that there are numerous strategies which start from the position of eradication, rather than 
inclusion. It is not in the remit of this paper to add to this stream of work. We do not want to add to the 
cookbook approach to dealing with resistance. Instead, we emphasise that there is a capacity within some 
strategies to disregard differences amongst and within user groups, and that even where management may hold 
significant power, such as in SMEs, resistance behaviour may succeed. Moverover, we were interested in how 
such strategies for ‘overcoming’ resistance can be appropriated in-situ to suit everyday user needs. In a SME 
context, given that owner Managing Directors have very firm ideas about how things should be done, then a case 
whereby these ideas might not necessarily take hold offers interest. 
3 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This case study was part of a larger three-year ethnographic study conducted, at T.Co (a pseudonym), a 
Management Careers Consultancy based in the North West of England. The study was positioned well both in 
timings and circumstances, as throughout the three year period a number of significant ICT projects were 
undertaken. ICT investment was considerable with the aims of increasing operational efficiency and supporting a 
strategically planned expansion. From 2000 until 2002 the organisation grew from two-sites, to a six-site 
operation with a national UK coverage. The first major ICT investment involved the migration of an obsolete 
Apple Mac platform to a PC platform and the second was the implementation of a Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) package. The decision to conduct an ethnographical study was informed by the fact that 
one of the researchers was situated at the organisation full-time as part of a Knowledge Transfer Partnership and 
another researcher attended the organisation at least one day per week. Furthermore ethnography allowed for 
flexibility in the research design and approach. As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) suggest, research design 
can be a reflexive process that operates throughout every stage of a project. Ethnography facilitates an iterative, 
inductive and co-dependent approach to data collection and analysis allowing for adaptation as the study 
progresses (O’Reilly, 2005). Ethnographers become the research instruments, reporting on what they observe, 
their experiences, and their interpretation of the social, cultural, and economic aspects that influence the research 
setting (Schulze 2000). Typically, the ethnographer focuses on a social setting (T.Co), building a relationship 
with key groups within that locale. This cultural immersion aims to reveal common understandings and 
assumptions whilst generating evidence that can be indicators of the phenomena under observation (Bartunek 
and Myeong-Gu-Seo, 2001). Access for this case study was exceptional, general company documentation was 
made available with restrictions only placed upon personnel records, and certain financial/strategic information. 
This level of inside access facilitated an in-depth observation of the working practices at T.Co and by the time 
the pilot project took place the researchers had already conducted two years of the ethnographical study leading 
to a high degree of immersion in the research setting.  
 
Throughout the study, various forms of data generation were used: unofficial informal narratives, official 
textual-based discourse, and participant observation. Early in the project, semi-structured interviews were 
conducted but it became evident that they were not productive so they were stopped. The participants were 
reluctant to be recorded due to the autocratic culture of the organisation and the Managing Director - Rupert. As 
an alternative to the interviewing process a research diary was kept and informal communications were logged 
which proved far more appropriate in such a dynamic environment. The participants were much more 
comfortable with this arrangement and this research technique yielded a more immediate reaction and frank 
commentaries from the workforce. Staff members featured in the research diary as and when noteworthy events 
occurred (alongside many mundane exchanges). A typical entry would include data regarding time, date, 
location, those members of staff present and subject matter. Direct quotes would be written down if possible 
along with a paraphrased narrative of the event and reference to any relevant documentary evidence. Diary 
entries were regularly crosschecked with those at T.Co. Some events were often recorded in precise detail. These 
event narratives were not treated as silos of data but as components of the whole study in conjunction with the 
text-based research and interpretation of the cultural artefacts of organisation. This study of the pilot project 
forms one of these ‘silos’ but is more informed than a traditional case study and better seen as an integral part of 
the larger ethnographical study.  
 
Rupert, who incidentally always referred to himself in the third person, was determined that the workforce, who 
had experienced extreme changes in their working practices, would not, under any circumstances, impede his 
proposed ICT strategy. His was an autocratic leader, with a capacity to be charismatic and the potential to be 
cruel. He was at times both loved and loathed by his workforce. Rupert felt pressurised to be seen to be ‘doing 
the right thing’ regarding supporting the workforce through change process although, arguably, this could be 
seen as a façade to mask his desire for things to work the way he wanted them to. There was an ad hoc change 
management programme at T.Co that evolved via a supply on demand approach. The pilot project could be 
described as part of this approach. As part of the change management programme it was decided to conduct a 
pilot project to introduce new working practices and processes prior to the CRM package implementation. It was 
crucial that those involved were kept informed throughout each stage including the development. It must be 
remembered at this point that this was an exercise to alter working practices so the pilot was an adaptation of the 
existing ICT system to introduce new procedures that would be reflected by the CRM package. Each version of 
the development was presented to those involved and their responses and reactions were collected and fed back 
into the pilot. Once the pilot project went live, the mandatory activities were monitored on a daily basis. The 
researchers were able to observe the interchange of the resistance activities and controlling strategies throughout 
the pilot project. This study allowed us to witness the termination of the pilot project due to user resistance, 
despite Rupert’s wishes.  
4 THE ENACTMENT AND APPROPRIATION OF A STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH 
RESISTANCE AT T.CO 
T.Co is a small, privately financed, business management consultancy; predominately concerned with the career 
guidance of senior management professionals. They provide guidance in finding new roles for those who have 
been made redundant or to deliver performance improvement training for those in the midst of a career change. 
This is done through processes of mentoring and networking, facilitated by personal Management Career 
Consultants. The Career Consultants were self-employed and the working relationship with T.Co was very 
informal with clients being allocated on an ad hoc basis. Their marketable products were expertise, capability 
and professionalism, with the team of Career Consultants referred to by Rupert as “grey haired gentlemen, not 
gelled hair young thrusters.” The consultancy claimed a 100% success rate attributing this to their bespoke career 
guidance service and in doing so distancing itself from standard recruitment agencies that offer regular 
advertised job opportunities. T.Co differentiated their service by focusing on networking, mentoring, the 
construction of sector knowledge banks, the identification of management gaps, and conducting speculative 
letter and CV campaigns. The people who paid for T.Co services were previous employers (Sponsors), who 
would provide such a career service bundled with severance packages.  
 
Once the Client’s started their ‘journey’ with T.Co, the clock began to tick. Their Sponsor would pay for a six-
month careers package. If a career opportunity were agreed in a matter of weeks, T.Co still received the full six-
month payment. T.Co’s mantra was to ‘reduce job search time,’ ensuring the client’s journey was fast, but 
without the sense of being rushed. The relationship between the Career Consultants and Rupert was mutually 
dependent.  However, the connections between these parties blurred blur because once the Client procedure 
started and the initial basic contact and contract details had been recorded and centrally stored at T.Co, the 
continuing Client information was stored by and kept externally with the Career Consultant. The rational was 
that Client information maybe of a sensitive nature so it should be stored securely. However, regular updates 
were expected from the Career Consultants (either by e-mail, hard copy report and sometimes verbally). Doris, 
the Administrator, then entered these onto the Client system. The process was problematic because there was 
always an ambiguity regarding who should record the data, Doris, the Sales Directors who would conduct the 
introductory meeting (the Royal Tour) with the Client or the Career Consultant who would only be allocated a 
Client after the Royal Tour. This often meant that Clients had the Royal Tour but that Doris was unaware of their 
existence. As a result, Clients were not assigned a Career Consultant at the crucial early stages because they did 
not appear on the system and therefore invoices were not sent out immediately because the Clients were not on 
the system. This situation was being replicated across the six regional offices. The existing process of sharing 
client information was ad hoc, informal and lent itself to uncertainty with key staff members being selective 
about what information was held centrally. As T.Co expanded geographically and the client base increased, this 
fuelled existing problems. The problem was that Management required current, accurate, client information but 
this was not readily available. Therefore, prior to any given senior management meeting there was a frenzied 
burst of activity targeted at gathering information from various sources and locations.  
 
As T.Co expanded Rupert decided to centrally store all client information (any job hunting practices, interview 
feedback, consultant meeting details) using the existing processes and IT system. That is, various staff would 
report all data to the Doris. Rupert planned a second stage, this involved giving the Career Consultants a 
mechanism by which they could enter their own data onto the centralised system. This process of decision-
making was located within the broader ICT implementation project. At this time, an organisation wide 
implementation strategy for CRM had recently been finalised with the client facing function and it was due to be 
implemented within that year. Rupert felt that this would allow time to enact some organisational change 
activities. Therefore, as part of the first phase, a pilot project was set up at the Head Office to be rolled out across 
all the regional offices after what Rupert called ‘any initial teething problems’. The pilot project incorporated 
newly designed forms and training sessions for the staff providing key Client information. This would be a major 
change to existing working practices for those involved especially when confronted with a mandatory 
involvement in the pilot project. An application was built, based upon the existing one for familiarity purposes. 
Furthermore to ensure that the pilot study was taken seriously, and key client information was collected, Rupert 
insisted on a strategy to enforce the mandatory population of the application. Any users who failed to enter the 
mandatory data were to be logged and Rupert was updated on a fortnightly basis. 
4.1 The heterogeneous user group: the organisational actors 
The key users differed in how they interacted with the newly designed application and their levels of 
organisational status. Table 1 illustrates the user group’s roles with the existing system, the details of what was 
required of them through out the pilot project and their status. It was recognised that the outcome of the project 
was to alter embedded behaviour and therefore it was agreed amongst Rupert, the Sales Directors and the Career 
Consultants that a rigid timeframes maybe too restrictive. It is worth remembering that Rupert would propose a 
concept and others would unanimously agree with his suggestions. Furthermore it is important to note that the 
pilot project was not a new idea sprung upon the unwilling workforce, there was documentary evidence that 
discussion and meetings had taken place for over a decade regarding the need to capture essential client data. 
Yet, given this history, Rupert and other board members were aware that opposition and confrontation would be 
the universal response to the planned changes. This was confirmed by the reaction of those involved in the 
requirement gathering stage and reiterated when Doris reported that the Pilot was being avoided from the outset. 
Rupert therefore devised the ‘naming and shaming’ strategy to overcome resistance and to ensure that the pilot 
project would, in his eyes, be a success. The ‘naming and shaming’ strategy was commensurate with how Rupert 
dealt with company matters, very publicly. For example, if Rupert received an email with spelling mistakes in it, 
no matter what the content or circulation list, he would forward the e-mail to the entire company, publicly 
condemning the sender and their poor spelling skills. The ‘naming and shaming’ strategy was a similar style of 
punishment; a list would be kept of those users who failed to use the pilot system as agreed and as trained. 
Rupert would be regularly up-dated and he would then send a company-wide e-mail, including the Board 
members, naming and (ideally) shaming those individuals who did not comply. In the following sections we will 
outline the experiences and responses of the key actors in the pilot project. 
 
 
 
 
 
User Groups Role as Related to the Existing System Role in the Pilot Project 
Doris: Administrator 
- Supporting role to 
Sales Director and 
Consultants, no 
managerial 
responsibilities. 
Role involved keeping database current, often 
required to answer analytical requests, maintain 
data for monthly board reports. Prior to pilot 
entered key data onto a database from paper 
forms, e-mails, verbal instructions and 
personally seeking data directly from clients  
 
Monitor the usage of Pilot 
system, report instances of 
misuse. To police all activity, 
naming individuals that did not 
conform which meant reporting 
more senior people to their 
superiors. 
 
Rupert: Managing 
Director - Reported to 
the Chairman of the 
Board  
 
Little input but he was closely involved with the 
system’s original design. 
If Doris was police then Rupert 
was judge, jury and executor 
Career Consultants - 
Self Employed and 
highly respected, a 
Managing Consultant 
represented them on 
the Board. 
 
Supplied data to Doris via a paper based form 
which should be completed with the client on 
the first meeting (this triggered the sending of 
invoices to sponsors).  Continued updating of 
Doris as necessary. 
To adhere to the new system – 
inputting client data directly 
into the pilot system.   
 
Sales Directors - 
Reported to a Regional 
Director but held a 
position on the Board. 
Conducted the introductory client meeting and 
started completion of the NCF.  This included 
the client’s details and those of the product that 
they had been sold.  Continued updating of 
Doris as necessary. 
 
To adhere to the new system – 
inputting client data directly 
into the pilot system. 
Table 1: Heterogeneous user group 
4.1.1 Doris - The Administrator  
Doris was a capable 60-year-old Administrator who worked incredibly hard, was generally overworked and felt 
unappreciated, making her irritable at times. A matriarch to new Clients, to some Career Consultants and 
younger staff members she was a conscientious employee and always got the job done. Her central location in 
the open plan office meant that everyone was within hearing range if Doris had a complaint or an objection to 
something. Doris was not known to keep her opinions to herself. Historically, the Administrator was the member 
of staff who usually inputted new Client data into the existing system. The Client data came via a New Client 
Form (NCF) that was completed (by hand) either by a Career Consultant or a Sales Director and handed to her. 
Completion of the NCF was often ignored, forgotten or only partially completed, leaving Doris to speculate and 
pursue basic contact details. As part of the requirement gathering stage it was determined that it would be 
beneficial to collect supplementary Client details together with the regular contact details and to make the 
completion of the NCF compulsory. Furthermore, the Career Consultants and Sales Directors were expected to 
start directly inputting Client data wherever possible, rather than passing the information through to Doris. It was 
expected that this would aid the change management process for the major implementation project. In practice 
this change management process immediately became problematic. Doris began to resist the Pilot for a number 
of reasons; she had to input the supplementary data into the system and believed her power base was being 
eroded. These were points of resistance because she had to undertake additional work and because, prior to the 
pilot project, she was the main individual at T.Co that could give instant overview of each Client. Doris knew 
who the Client’s Career Consultants were and was knowledgeable about the status of each Client’s career 
campaign. The implication of the changes were that her role might eventually be made redundant or change 
significantly, particularly as related to the downgrading (in her eyes) of her status. In terms of her resistance 
practices, she vocalised, and exaggerated, the instances of incorrect data entry by others, and continually 
highlighted the fact that other people could cause big problems if they were allowed access to the system. Her 
central position in the office ensured that no one was able to ignore her. Thus Doris created an atmosphere of 
uncertainty surrounding the pilot project. There was a conflict in Doris’s actions because as part of her 
administrator role it was beneficial that the Client data was inputted but she was fearful that she would loose 
control. The blanket prescription of the naming and shaming strategy did not prevent these resistance practices. 
Doris was required to compile the naming and shaming list, but this actually supported part of her strategy of 
resistance. Doris was able to highlight publicly that people were not inputting the data to make the system work 
and thus that the old (her) system was better. 
4.1.2 The Career Consultants 
The Career Consultant’s were powerful individuals at T.Co as being self-employed allowed them some 
protection from company protocols. They had an extremely comfortable arrangement with respect to obtaining 
work. Doris was aware of their availability so new Clients were automatically matched against a consultant’s 
skills and expertise, therefore they never had to pursue work. The Career Consultants were paid monthly, usually 
regardless of how often they met with the Client, payment ending once the Client became employed again. Doris 
inputted essential Client data but the majority of Client data throughout the recruitment campaign was stored off-
site with the Career Consultants. Client reports were submitted monthly to the Doris and she inputted the data. 
Often the reports were very ad-hoc, irregular, in different formats and any client up-dates that were needed 
immediately were usually collected verbally over the telephone. The Pilot required all client-consultant 
recruitment practices to be captured and Client meetings to be logged centrally. The Career Consultants resisted 
this as they did not want client-consultant practices scrutinised. Currently they were managing the recruitment 
campaign, and they did not want to share their knowledge or expertise. Like Doris they resisted the pilot project 
because their powerful positions and professional expertise was under threat and they were also required to 
contribute to this threat by inputting the data themselves. They resisted because they faced a reduction of their 
power and status, a dilution of their knowledge, their current private client relationship was to become public and 
all meetings were to be logged which may have impacted on their fees if the quota was not met. In addition they 
believed that the non-paid ‘secretarial’ work of inputting data was not part of their role. There was also a real 
fear of the new technology (Career Consultants are predominately near retirement age and some were IT 
illiterate). 
 
Conspiring with each other the Career Consultants became a imposing force, adding extra alarmed voices by 
highlighting inadequacies and shortcomings of the pilot project, new procedures, and questioning the 
confidentially and security risks of centralising highly sensitive private data. The Career Consultants tactic was 
simple, ignoring initial attempts to release this information until directly asked by Rupert (the pilot project 
dissolved before this stage was reached in earnest). A further tactic was avoidance, creating a chaotic 
problematic situation when attempting to enter data. This was helped enormously by the fact that Career 
Consultants had to share PCs with part-time staff members. Claims of the system not working were rife, a flurry 
of statements about being too busy were made and requests for formal training to be organised became prevalent. 
Career Consultants also increasingly arranged meetings away from the office to avoid confrontation with Rupert 
regarding the pilot. The name and shame strategy had minimal impact on the Consultants. After the initial shock 
of being named publicly there was a dissolving of the effect, an apathetic laissez-faire attitude prevailed. At 
some stage nearly all the Career Consultant’s had been publicly named and shamed and it became a badge of 
honour. They were part of a reciprocal relationship and could easily walk away, they were nearing retirement, 
were self-employed and they would not be intimidated.  
4.1.3 The Sales Directors  
The Sales Directors, in conjunction with Doris, conducted the Royal Tour with the new Clients and matched 
them with a Career Consultant. This involved arranging a meeting at the company premises where they would 
start to complete the NCF. Basic contact data was collected alongside details regarding what Career Campaign 
(services) the Client had purchased. This data collection method was very informal, sometimes completed on a 
paper and handed to the Doris for inputting, other times it was e-mailed but usually Doris would have to collect 
the required information on the Client’s following meetings. It could therefore be weeks before other 
departments in the company were aware that there was a new Client to be dealt with. The sales team were all at 
Director level so there was an immediate resistance to the requests of a formal structure in how they worked and 
the anticipated extra workload of populating the pilot with mandatory data was completely frowned upon. They 
all agreed to the idea in theory and no individual voiced their concerns at the discussion stage of this pilot project 
as it was felt ‘that would not be a good career move’ given the initiative was owned by Rupert. Yet, the Sales 
Directors did not want explicit details of their sales contracts being made public because although services were 
standardised they offered variations of the services to tempt the Client into finalising a deal. They resisted on 
many levels with the additional fear of technology - like the Career Consultants some Directors were not IT 
literate. The reason for their resistance was also partly because of their position in the company - they deemed 
themselves above inputting data and did not like the idea of being policed by who they saw as a subordinate staff 
member. Doris who was appointed to ‘police’ the pilot was therefore placed in a difficult position, having to 
inform on her superiors to Rupert. Ultimately, the Sales Directors were not directly affected by the ‘Name and 
Shame’ as they asked Doris to input the data on their behalf.  
5 DISCUSSION 
Markus (1983) identifies three theories (causes) of resistance. The first two are, people determined (influenced 
by a person’s internal factors) and system determined (influenced by external factors associated with the 
perceptions of the features of piece of technology). These two theories regard resistance as a negative intrusion 
that should be eradicated. The assumption is, that designer’s and/or implementer’s intentions or objectives 
should not be questioned just accepted. The third theory, Interaction Theory, differs in that resistance is not 
determined outside the context of the system designer’s intentions. The causes of resistance arise as a result of 
the potential outcomes of the use of technology by people and the assumption is that resistance is a response to 
the setting, user and designer objectives being neither desirable nor undesirable. On these bases, Markus 
discusses alternative approaches to developing strategies to avoid resistance. In relation to system determined 
theory, designers may increase levels of user participation and enhancement to functionality and usability may 
eliminate resistance, with people determined theory, a change or rotation of people involved may eliminate 
resistance. In terms of the Interaction Theory informed approach Markus (1983: 441) argues that ‘no tactics are 
useful in every situation’, the best prescriptions for an implementation strategy follow from a thorough diagnosis 
of the organisational setting and the augmentation of any technical development with a socio-political analysis. 
We concur with Markus and others (Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Selwyn, 2003; Hirschheim et. al., 1988; 
Keen, 1981; Grover, 1988) that resistance behaviour has numerous guises and is motivated by many causes. 
Clearly Markus’ work still has value. The Interaction Theory she posits clearly has resonance in the T.Co case 
study. Rupert’s generic, ‘directive’ tactics (Jiang et. al., 2000) for overcoming resistance were not useful. The 
user base was comprised of three distinct types of resisters each with their own agenda and their resistance was 
very much rooted in the interaction of ‘social’ and ‘technical’ features of the work environment. However, we 
have to remember that T.Co is an SME and as such it is well known that they often face resource limitations, 
which affect their abilities to enact organisational, and ICT development (Welsh and White, 1981; Gable, 1991; 
Levy et. al., 1998; Caldeira and Ward, 2002). Moreover, as we stated in the introduction to this paper, SME 
owner managers often have very particular requirements for ‘their’ business (Darazdi, 1993; Reynolds and 
Miller, 1992; Carter et. al., 1996; Boeker, 1988). Thus, although Markus (1983) suggests that one route to 
avoiding resistance is to undertake a thorough organisational analysis, in an SME context this may not be 
possible due to limited resources and/or a lack of desire for alternate views other than the owners. However, 
even though owner-managers may hold such views, as other critiques of the strategic management and 
entrepreneurship suggest (Martin et. al., 1985; Alvesson, 1993; Rowlinson and Proctor, 1999), the T.Co study 
supports the idea that these might not necessarily translate into action. 
 
Clearly, the staff at T.Co were aware that technology had the ability to alter working relationships, reroute 
existing communication channels and modify power, authority and control structures. Doris and the Career 
Consultants in our case study explicitly illustrate this. Doris became the collective centre for the information. As 
she took on the role of the gatekeeper of client knowledge the Consultants perceived their power and authority to 
be slipping away resulting in responses from them such as ‘sorry Doris, it’s personal information that only I 
have the authority to know’. A further dimension of resistance was witnessed with respect to the distribution of 
client information and the dissolution of power structures as experienced by the Sales Directors. They struggled 
with the change in their working relationship with the, lower status, Administrator resisting her attempts to 
monitor and manage how they work hence statements were made such as: ‘…. who the hell do you think you 
are…fill what box where …I don’t think so!!’ Furthermore, we see resistance caused by users who perceive the 
ICT as threatening and unnecessary, and ultimately as a criticism of their working practices (Keen, 1981; 
Grover, 1988; Markus and Pfeffer, 1983). The Career Consultants viewed the situation as a personal attack on 
their professionalism resulting in comments such as: ‘I have been doing it this way for the past ten years, why fix 
something that isn’t broken’. Yet, of course it is also important to remember that some causes of resistance were 
shared. We encountered a good degree of the fear of change, no matter how prepared the individuals were, or 
what level of user participation was instigated (Markus 1981, Friedman and Cornford, 1989; Selwyn, 2003; 
Hirschheim and Newman, 1988). 
 
The endeavours of the project team to initiate the pilot project and change embedded working practices was 
always going to be a difficult task and Rupert knew this. However he perceived resistance as a dysfunctional 
behaviour that required eradication, regardless of consequences.  Yet, he underestimated the extent and nature of 
resistance at this stage. Thus, although the ‘Name and Shame’ list was produced and emailed out each week, it 
failed. The strategy did not allow for any demarcation of the actors involved in resistance practices or 
incorporate any attempt to understand why these senior professionals, external Career Consultants or 
administration staff resisted. Doris in terms of her resistance practices (in particular highlighting the fact that 
numerous people inputting would create data quality concerns) was actually supported in her activity through the 
act of naming and shaming. This allowed her to publicise the fact that other people being involved would make 
the system fall down. Further, because Rupert overlooked the fact that the Career Consultants were not directly 
under the company’s governance, but critical players of the client service delivery team, this also contributed to 
the failure of his strategy.  Further their resistance tactics involved claims of professionalism through the 
highlighting of the inadequacies of the pilot, the questioning of client confidentially and the security risks of 
centralising highly sensitive private data. They were able to overtly decline any attempts to enforce co-operation. 
The Career Consultants were members of a mutually reciprocal relationship and they would not be intimidated. 
The blanket prescription strategy failed when used against the Sales Directors because of their position in the 
company, they used their status to avoid being placed upon the shame list by requesting that Doris enact data 
entry processes on their behalf. Indeed, all the groups colluded against Rupert’s strategy as it was in their shared 
interests. The generic strategy applied to this heterogeneous group failed to resolve the situation because the 
users were from very unique groups in key internal and external roles with differing agendas and motivations. In 
not understanding and addressing these issues Rupert retreated as the ‘Name and Shame’ strategy lost its 
impetus. This analysis allows us to add to Markus’ work. 
 
Since the 1980s a body of work regarding the sociology of technology has emerged – the Social Shaping of 
Technology/Social Construction of Technology perspective (Bijker and Law 1994; Bijker et. al 1989). Central to 
this work is the idea that the development and enactment of technology (in the broadest sense) is unpredictable 
because ongoing work is performed beyond the ‘design room’ (Fleck, 1994; Stewart and Williams, 2005). 
Although Markus’ (1983) Interaction Theory recognises the importance of the understanding the socio-political 
milieu with respect to resistance in ICT development, it does somewhat incorporate a rather flat, one-way view 
of this phenomena. That is, unlike a social shaping view, strategies (or technologies) for avoiding resistance are 
fundamentally conceptualised as being made by managers (the designers) and applied to resisters (users). The 
outcomes of this intervention are then conceptualised as working or not given the degree to which they are 
informed by the context of their enactment. This is where we extend Markus’ work. If we conceptualise the 
deployment of resistance strategies as indeterminate and subject to the potentiality for ongoing work we avoid 
the problems of social and technological determinism and can open up the processes by which resistance 
practices are enacted. At T.Co this is perhaps most readily visible in Doris’ actions – she directly appropriated 
the naming and shaming strategy to suit her own agenda. However, upon closer inspection, it is also evident that 
the Consultants and Sales Directors also drew upon the name and shame strategy as a resource. In both cases 
these groups enrolled the tenants of the strategy (being named and shamed) in their strategies of resistance. This 
took the form of various references to their professional identity particularly in terms of claims to autonomy, 
client confidentiality and their status not being commensurate with data entry and monitoring of the type 
deployed. The analogy here is a game of tennis whereby one player hits the ball very hard and in return the other 
player merely sticks out their racket in the right place and at the right time and in doing so users the power of the 
other player to hit a winning shot. Usually, the first player does not intend or expect for this to happen.  
6   CONCLUSION 
Previous research on owner managers and SMEs usually emphasises the necessary and significant influence such 
actors can have in organisational development and ICT related initiatives. There is however another view, which 
is less, convinced about the quantity and quality of such interventions. Our research contributes to highlighting 
this dialectic. Although owner managers in SMEs may have a unitary view of organisations that they seek to 
impose upon others, we clearly show that such actors do not always make effective interventions that make the 
impact they intended. It would be all too easy to link such failure with a dearth of resources in SMEs, which 
disallows proper thinking time, and the investigation of the socio-political milieu of organisations as a precursor 
to ICT related change. Whilst such an analysis may help matters it is deterministic to assume it will. As Stewart 
and Williams (2005) state, it privileges prior design, it is unrealistic and unduly simplistic, it may not be 
effective in enhancing design/use and it overlooks opportunities for intervention.  
 
Markus (1983) has argued that better theories of resistance will lead to better strategies for avoiding with it. She 
recommends that explanations of resistance are vital because no matter how obvious or intrinsic the theories are; 
they ultimately guide the strategies of those attached to the management of ICT development. With this in mind 
25 years on (somewhat late in the day!) we respond to Markus’ call for further empirical work that contributes to 
our understanding of the Interaction Theory of resistance. Markus’ work clearly still has value. However our 
wider review of the literatures on resistance and ICTs has focussed our attention upon a range of issues – the 
notion of resistance, rationales for resistance, methods of resisting and strategies for overcoming/avoiding it. 
From this review it became clear that Markus’ work incorporates a fairly flat view of user-developer relations 
and thus whilst she discussed the nature and rationales for resistance, we felt more of a focus upon methods of 
resistance and the pre-emptive/responsive strategies was required. 
 
Our study suggests the value in a move beyond the fairly fixed idea of a strategy for dealing with resistance 
being developed by a group of managers and then being bluntly implemented. We nuance this further by 
unpacking the ongoing work that resisters put into resistance strategies (originally developed by managers) to 
nullify them and/or use them for their own ends. Moreover, drawing upon existing thought on mechanisms for 
resistance we add richness to the ways in which people might resist. Further research is required that considers 
the active role users play in the appropriation of the strategies developed and deployed by managers to 
overcome/avoid resistance. We also believe it would be helpful for future studies to become more attuned to 
diversity in users bases when considering ICT related resistance. 
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